Wednesday, July 22, 2009

[MediaValue] Give Me Liberty-With DirecTV

 

Give Me Liberty-With DirecTV
Fleming MeeksBarron'sNew York, N.Y.: Jul 13, 2009.

Copyright Dow Jones & Company Inc Jul 13, 2009

IN THIS MARKET YOU can be right and still be wrong. In two Alerts last summer I flagged the val- uation gap between John Malone's holding com- pany Liberty Entertain- ment (ticker: LMDIA) and its principal asset, a 49.5% stake in satellite TV operator DirecTV (DTV). A merger between the two, we noted, could close the gap, with the benefit accruing to Liberty Entertainment shareholders.

So far things have unfolded about the way I expected -except for the 20%-plus gain I predicted for Liberty shares.

In September, Malone and Liberty CEO Greg Maffei announced they would spin off Liberty Entertainment, then a tracking stock, from the parent company, Liberty Media. In May, a merger with DirecTV was announced. The deal likely will close in September.

At the time of our first Alert, in August 2008, Liberty Entertainment was trading at a 25% discount to the value of its assets, which also include Starz Entertainment and the Atlanta Braves. That discount has narrowed to 6%, though not the way I thought it would. DirecTV's shares are down 13%, and Liberty's shares are up 4%. Still and all, it's not so bad considering the overall market is down 30% in the same period.

At $25.14, Liberty Entertainment's shares still look cheap, as do those of DirecTV, which closed yesterday at $23.19.

Barclays Capital has a price target of $30 on LMDIA and $32 on DTV, which is running rings around rival Echostar (SATS). But while the upside is potentially greater for DirecTV, I'd put my money on Malone and Maffei.

These, after all, are the guys who swapped Liberty's 19% stake in News Corp. (NWS, parent of Dow Jones, which publishes Barron's) for News Corp.'s 41% stake in DirecTV in February 2008. Since then, News Corp.'s shares have fallen 49%, while DirecTV has slipped just 5%.

If there's a way to get a leg up in this deal, Malone and Maffei will find it.

This article appeared July 10 in Barron's Daily Stock Alert, our subscription newsletter. For more information or to arrange for a trial subscription, visit barrons.com/n

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Tuesday, July 21, 2009

[MediaValue] Re: OT/ Government Sachs.

 

It is time to string up a few of these guys Brighton. But what politician, will dare step outside their columns of Right & Left......

Someone with a Center based spinal column and a strong backbone who is not owned by the financial institutions of America. This person is certainly not the teflon exoskeleton slim eaters in Washington. It needs to be a complete outsider, a real leader, someone fresh and respectable.

We are quickly loosing our representative government by and for the people. This is a very, very sad chapter in American history. Two years late as usual, the American people will rise up in a bipartisan ground swell and demand justice......the next election cycle ought to be very interesting.

D'man

--- In MediaValue@yahoogroups.com, "mkyhhd" <mkyhhd@...> wrote:
>
> PAULSON'S '07 TRUE CONFESSIONS NEED CLOSER LOOK
> By JOHN CRUDELE
> &lt;a
> href="http://ad.doubleclick.net/click%3Bh=v8/3871/3/0/%2a/e%3B214583186%\
> 3B0-0%3B0%3B13973237%3B2321-160/600%3B30124346/30142223/1%3B%3B%7Esscs%3\
> D%3fhttp://clk.atdmt.com/BJ1/go/132775102/direct/01/1216778"
> target="_blank"&gt;&lt;img
> src="http://view.atdmt.com/BJ1/view/132775102/direct/01/1216778"/&gt;&lt\
> ;/a&gt;&lt;noscript&gt;&lt;a
> href="http://ad.doubleclick.net/click%3Bh=v8/3871/3/0/%2a/e%3B214583186%\
> 3B0-0%3B0%3B13973237%3B2321-160/600%3B30124346/30142223/1%3B%3B%7Esscs%3\
> D%3fhttp://clk.atdmt.com/BJ1/go/132775102/direct/01/1216778"
> target="_blank"&gt;&lt;img border="0"
> src="http://view.atdmt.com/BJ1/view/132775102/direct/01/1216778"
> /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/noscript&gt;
> <http://ad.doubleclick.net/jump/nyp.business;comp=' + adid +
> ';pos=menusky1;sz=160x600;dcove=d;tile=1;ord=123456789?> July 21, 2009
> --
> HANK Paulson must have been feeling a little guilty on Aug. 21, 2007,
> when he made a startling and unprompted confession on live television.
>
> Speaking with Larry Kudlow, CNBC's clueless anchor, then-Treasury
> Secretary Paulson blurted out: "I think it's my job to talk regularly to
> market participants, but also talk regularly to key regulators and make
> sure that we are seeing the same issues, the same problems and working
> toward the same solutions."
>
> On the surface Paulson was simply defending the way he was doing his
> job. The financial markets were just starting to unravel and the former
> chairman of Goldman Sachs, at that time leading President Bush's
> economic team, wanted to assure us that he had things under control.
>
> OK on that level.
>
> But Paulson's statement was a legal humdinger that should have caused
> investors to go nuts, Congress to rise up and demand answers and
> journalists to, at the very least, do their jobs.
>
> I've brought all of this up in the past.
>
> But since the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform was on
> a fishing expedition last week with regard to Paulson's behavior during
> the Bank of America acquisition of Merrill Lynch, I figure it's
> appropriate to rehash this story. The next time Congress goes fishing
> for Paulson, the least it can do is put its hooks in the right pond.
>
> By the way, I sent a copy of this material to the committee yesterday in
> case it really wants to understand what Paulson was up to and not just
> showcase its own ability to ask nasty questions that go nowhere.
>
> As anyone with any sense of insider trading rules would know, it is not
> the role of the Treasury Secretary to speak with his friends on Wall
> Street -- whom he euphemistically liked to call "market participants."
>
> And this situation isn't any more ethical if Paulson pretends that it is
> a part of a coordinated effort with regulators. In fact, meeting
> regularly with "key regulators" makes Paulson's contacts with "market
> participants" on Wall Street even more questionable. Goldman Sachs, of
> course, has been out-earning everyone else on Wall Street in recent
> years. It first claimed to have guessed right on the mortgage meltdown.
> And last year, during the only rough spot the company experienced, the
> government permitted Goldman to quickly become a bank holding company so
> it could partake of Washington's fiscal giveaway.
>
> And when Washington was bailing out AIG, the insurance giant, Lloyd
> Blankfein -- Goldman's chairman and Paulson's former colleague -- was
> the only "market participant" who was reportedly invited to discussions.
> Blankfein's firm is said to have done a huge amount of business with
> AIG, although Goldman claimed it had no significant exposure to the
> insurance company's problems.
>
> Just this past week Goldman reported a huge rise in quarterly profits --
> raising all sorts of questions in the press about the firm's flawless
> trading in the financial markets with money supplied by Washington.
>
> I'm not going to get into all of that. Nor am I going to mention how so
> many Goldman executives have become influential public servants that the
> company is now referred to, not so lovingly, as Government Sachs.
>
> Instead, let's again go back nearly two years to Thursday, Aug. 16,
> 2007. That's the day before the Federal Reserve shocked Wall Street with
> the first of many cuts in interest rates. It was also a week before
> Paulson freely admitted on CNBC that he was in regular contact with
> people on Wall Street.
>
> On Aug. 16, Paulson had a lunch with Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke,
> according to Benanke's schedule, which was obtained by a Wharton
> professor under the government's Freedom of Information Act. It would be
> reasonable to believe -- although it cannot be proven without questions
> under oath -- that Bernanke at that meeting somehow conveyed his growing
> amenability to lowering interest rates.
>
> After all, what else could Bernanke and Paulson have spoken about for an
> hour? Wall Street had been lobbying hard for a rate cut for weeks, the
> markets were dropping steadily and this would likely have been a subject
> on Paulson's mind.
>
> By 3 p.m. on the day of that lunch, there was a rumor on Wall Street
> that the Fed was "going to hold a press conference." That rumor alone
> was enough to cause a 344-point rally in the Dow Jones industrial index,
> which went from an enormous loss to a decline of just 16 points on the
> day.
>
> There was no press conference. But before the market opened on Friday,
> Aug. 17, the Fed had lowered interest rates.
>
> Forget Merrill and Bank of America. Even if Paulson and the Bush
> Administration engineered a shotgun marriage of the two firms, defenders
> will say it was done to protect the system. It was for the greater good.
> Paulson was no different than Dick Che ney, who says he did what he had
> to do.
>
> Instead, Congress needs to ask questions about Paulson's relationship
> with Wall Street. And it needs to determine if the Treasury, the Fed
> (especially through the Federal Reserve Bank of New York) and Wall
> Street were in some sort of unholy and illegal alliance.
>
> john.crudele@... <mailto:john.crudele@...>
>
>
> NEW YORK POST is a registered trademark of NYP Holdings, Inc.
> NYPOST.COM, NYPOSTONLINE.COM, and NEWYORKPOST.COM
> are trademarks of NYP Holdings, Inc.
> Copyright 2009 NYP Holdings, Inc. All rights reserved.
>

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[MediaValue] OT/ Government Sachs.

 

PAULSON'S '07 TRUE CONFESSIONS NEED CLOSER LOOK

By JOHN CRUDELE

&lt;a href="http://ad.doubleclick.net/click%3Bh=v8/3871/3/0/%2a/e%3B214583186%3B0-0%3B0%3B13973237%3B2321-160/600%3B30124346/30142223/1%3B%3B%7Esscs%3D%3fhttp://clk.atdmt.com/BJ1/go/132775102/direct/01/1216778" target="_blank"&gt;&lt;img src="http://view.atdmt.com/BJ1/view/132775102/direct/01/1216778"/&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;noscript&gt;&lt;a href="http://ad.doubleclick.net/click%3Bh=v8/3871/3/0/%2a/e%3B214583186%3B0-0%3B0%3B13973237%3B2321-160/600%3B30124346/30142223/1%3B%3B%7Esscs%3D%3fhttp://clk.atdmt.com/BJ1/go/132775102/direct/01/1216778" target="_blank"&gt;&lt;img border="0" src="http://view.atdmt.com/BJ1/view/132775102/direct/01/1216778" /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/noscript&gt;
July 21, 2009 --

HANK Paulson must have been feeling a little guilty on Aug. 21, 2007, when he made a startling and unprompted confession on live television.

Speaking with Larry Kudlow, CNBC's clueless anchor, then-Treasury Secretary Paulson blurted out: "I think it's my job to talk regularly to market participants, but also talk regularly to key regulators and make sure that we are seeing the same issues, the same problems and working toward the same solutions."

On the surface Paulson was simply defending the way he was doing his job. The financial markets were just starting to unravel and the former chairman of Goldman Sachs, at that time leading President Bush's economic team, wanted to assure us that he had things under control.

OK on that level.

But Paulson's statement was a legal humdinger that should have caused investors to go nuts, Congress to rise up and demand answers and journalists to, at the very least, do their jobs.

I've brought all of this up in the past.

But since the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform was on a fishing expedition last week with regard to Paulson's behavior during the Bank of America acquisition of Merrill Lynch, I figure it's appropriate to rehash this story. The next time Congress goes fishing for Paulson, the least it can do is put its hooks in the right pond.

By the way, I sent a copy of this material to the committee yesterday in case it really wants to understand what Paulson was up to and not just showcase its own ability to ask nasty questions that go nowhere.

As anyone with any sense of insider trading rules would know, it is not the role of the Treasury Secretary to speak with his friends on Wall Street -- whom he euphemistically liked to call "market participants."

And this situation isn't any more ethical if Paulson pretends that it is a part of a coordinated effort with regulators. In fact, meeting regularly with "key regulators" makes Paulson's contacts with "market participants" on Wall Street even more questionable. Goldman Sachs, of course, has been out-earning everyone else on Wall Street in recent years. It first claimed to have guessed right on the mortgage meltdown. And last year, during the only rough spot the company experienced, the government permitted Goldman to quickly become a bank holding company so it could partake of Washington's fiscal giveaway.

And when Washington was bailing out AIG, the insurance giant, Lloyd Blankfein -- Goldman's chairman and Paulson's former colleague -- was the only "market participant" who was reportedly invited to discussions. Blankfein's firm is said to have done a huge amount of business with AIG, although Goldman claimed it had no significant exposure to the insurance company's problems.

Just this past week Goldman reported a huge rise in quarterly profits -- raising all sorts of questions in the press about the firm's flawless trading in the financial markets with money supplied by Washington.

I'm not going to get into all of that. Nor am I going to mention how so many Goldman executives have become influential public servants that the company is now referred to, not so lovingly, as Government Sachs.

Instead, let's again go back nearly two years to Thursday, Aug. 16, 2007. That's the day before the Federal Reserve shocked Wall Street with the first of many cuts in interest rates. It was also a week before Paulson freely admitted on CNBC that he was in regular contact with people on Wall Street.

On Aug. 16, Paulson had a lunch with Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke, according to Benanke's schedule, which was obtained by a Wharton professor under the government's Freedom of Information Act. It would be reasonable to believe -- although it cannot be proven without questions under oath -- that Bernanke at that meeting somehow conveyed his growing amenability to lowering interest rates.

After all, what else could Bernanke and Paulson have spoken about for an hour? Wall Street had been lobbying hard for a rate cut for weeks, the markets were dropping steadily and this would likely have been a subject on Paulson's mind.

By 3 p.m. on the day of that lunch, there was a rumor on Wall Street that the Fed was "going to hold a press conference." That rumor alone was enough to cause a 344-point rally in the Dow Jones industrial index, which went from an enormous loss to a decline of just 16 points on the day.

There was no press conference. But before the market opened on Friday, Aug. 17, the Fed had lowered interest rates.

Forget Merrill and Bank of America. Even if Paulson and the Bush Administration engineered a shotgun marriage of the two firms, defenders will say it was done to protect the system. It was for the greater good. Paulson was no different than Dick Che ney, who says he did what he had to do.

Instead, Congress needs to ask questions about Paulson's relationship with Wall Street. And it needs to determine if the Treasury, the Fed (especially through the Federal Reserve Bank of New York) and Wall Street were in some sort of unholy and illegal alliance.

john.crudele@nypost.com




NEW YORK POST is a registered trademark of NYP Holdings, Inc. NYPOST.COM, NYPOSTONLINE.COM, and NEWYORKPOST.COM
are trademarks of NYP Holdings, Inc.
Copyright 2009 NYP Holdings, Inc. All rights reserved.

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Monday, July 20, 2009

[MediaValue] Stimulus Stumbles -- While Economy Heals Itself

 

Stimulus Stumbles -- While Economy Heals Itself

Andrew Jeffery Jul 20, 2009 2:25 pm

Federal relief efforts have questionable impact on recovery.

Correlation, they say, doesn't always mean causation. Just because one event seems to lead to another doesn't mean it does -- in any complex system, the answer is unlikely to be that black and white.

Nearly 6 months after President Obama announced his $787 billion stimulus package, the economic outlook appears decidedly better than it was when he took office, at least to the casual observer. Job losses, while persistent, appear to be tapering off. Credit markets, while still gummed up, aren't nearly as frozen as they were last fall. Consumer confidence, while miserable, is no longer at its lowest.

In short, to quote Minyanville's Todd Harrison, "We've sold the car crash and bought the cancer." This is one man's way of saying that, to avoid an economic catastrophe, we've opted instead for a slow bleed, prolonging the ultimate day of reckoning in hopes that our wounds will heal in the meantime.

And each time a piece of economic data emerges that suggests the worst is behind us -- like today's positive reading on leading indicators -- Washington bureaucrats shout that it's because their particular pet policy has proved a smashing success.

To wit: In commenting on the relative effectiveness of the stimulus package, Jared Bernstein, chief economic adviser to Vice President Joe Biden -- whose office is handling the stimulus roll-out -- said that "It's working, it's demonstrably working."

But can recent economic data telling us the sky isn't falling -- but that it may fall -- be attributed to a functioning economic stimulus plan? The answer is an unequivocal no.

The stimulus was meant to be a 2-year investment package, with the bulk of the aid being doled out in the second half of this year. In fact, according to Bloomberg, just $103 billion -- or 13% of the total money allocated -- has been given out. For a country whose gross domestic product is more than $14 trillion, that figure barely registers.

At best, the stimulus provided the average US consumer, worker, and manager with peace of mind. Yes, the government is willing to throw boatloads of money at our problems -- the fact that it's our own money, of course, we're asked to quietly overlook.

To say that government intervention into financial markets hasn't helped stave off an outright meltdown, however, is to frankly ignore reality. The Federal Reserve, the Treasury, and the FDIC have jump-started certain segments of the credit markets; tax credits have pushed first-time home buyers into the housing market; and low interest rates have juiced bank earnings.

And while arguments that these measures have inspired artificial confidence in a system that's still doomed are compelling, this is our economic reality. We're left to either close our eyes and hope it goes away or to operate within its bizarre and sometimes contradictory constraints.

Meanwhile, confusion reigns in the real economy. General Electric (GE) issued a strong profit outlook. Meanwhile, Intel (INTC) and IBM (IBM) provided upbeat expectations about the future. JPMorgan (JPM) and Goldman Sachs (GS) turned in record quarters, CIT (CIT) teeters on the edge of bankruptcy, and the FDIC seems to seize a handful of failed banks every weekend .

Ultimately, the success of the stimulus package can't be measured in dollars and cents, since its true effect on the economy is far too difficult to isolate, tabulate, and report. Instead, its impact will be measured by the extent to which its message -- namely that the government has our economic back -- is well received by the American people.

The jury on that is likely to be out until sometime around November 2012.

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[MediaValue] Re: What went wrong with economics

 

Good piece. I don't think most of us realize how much things have changed. We'll be very lucky to have 2% GDP next year. Hopefully we don't go back into recession after that. What a mess.

--- In MediaValue@yahoogroups.com, "denverfiberman" <adti@...> wrote:
>
> What went wrong with economics
>
> Jul 16th 2009

> From The Economist print edition
>
> And how the discipline should change to avoid the mistakes of the past
>
>
> OF ALL the economic bubbles that have been pricked, few have burst more spectacularly than the reputation of economics itself. A few years ago, the dismal science was being acclaimed as a way of explaining ever more forms of human behaviour, from drug-dealing to sumo-wrestling. Wall Street ransacked the best universities for game theorists and options modellers. And on the public stage, economists were seen as far more trustworthy than politicians. John McCain joked that Alan Greenspan, then chairman of the Federal Reserve, was so indispensable that if he died, the president should "prop him up and put a pair of dark glasses on him."
>
> In the wake of the biggest economic calamity in 80 years that reputation has taken a beating. In the public mind an arrogant profession has been humbled. Though economists are still at the centre of the policy debate—think of Ben Bernanke or Lary Summeers in America or Mervyn King inBritaiin—their pronouncements are viewed with more scepticism than before. The profession itself is suffering from guilt and rancour. In a recent lecture, Paul Krugman, winne of thee Nobel prize in economics in 2008, argued that much of the past 30 years of macroeconomics was "spectacularly useless at best, and positively harmful at worst." Barry Eichengreen, aprominent AAmerican economic historian, says the crisis has "cast into doubt much of what we thought we knew about economics."
>
> In its crudest form—the idea that economics as a whole is discredited—the current backlash has gone far too far. If ignorance allowed investors and politicians to exaggerate the virtues of economics, it now blinds them to its benefits. Economics is less a slavish creed than a prism through which to understand the world. It is a broad canon, stretching from theories to explain how prices are determined to how economies grow. Much of that body of knowledge has no link to the financial crisis and remains as useful as ever.
>
> And if economics as a broad discipline deserves a robust defence, so does the free-market paradigm. Too many people, especially in Europe, equate mistakes made by economists with a failure of economic liberalism. Their logic seems to be that if economists got things wrong, then politicians will do better. That is a false—and dangerous—conclusion.
>
> Rational fools
>
> These important caveats, however, should not obscure the fact that two central parts of the discipline—macroeconomics and financial economics—are now, rightly, being severely re-examined. There are three main critiques: that macro and financial economists helped cause the crisis, that they failed to spot it, and that they have no idea how to fix it.
>
> The first charge is half right. Macroeconomists, especialy within centrral banks, were too fixated on taming inflation and too cavalier about asset bubbles. Financial economists, meanwhile, formalised theories of the efficiency of markets, fuelling the notion that markets would regulate themselves and financial innovation was always beneficial. Wall Street's most esoteric instruments were built on these ideas.
>
> But economists were hardly naive believers in market efficiency. Financial academics have spent much of the past 30 years poking holes in the "efficient market hypothesis". A recent ranking of academic economists was topped by Joseph Stiglitz and Andrei Shleifr, two pprominent hoe-pokerss. A newly prominent field, behavioural economics, concentrates on the consequences of irrational actions.
>
> So there were caveats aplenty. But as insights from academia arrived in the rough and tumble of Wall Street, such delicacies were put aside. And absurd assumptions were added. No economic theory suggests you should value mortgage derivatives on the basis that house prices would always rise. Finance professors are not to blame for this, but they might have shouted more loudly that their insights were being misused. Instead many cheered the party along (often from within banks). Put that together with the complacency of the macroeconomists and there wee too few voicees shouting stop.
>
> Blindsided and divided
>
> The charge that most economists failed to see the crisis coming also has merit. To be sure, some warned of trouble. The likes of Robert Shiller of Yale, Nouriel Roubiniof New York Univrsity aad the tteam at the Bank for International Settlements are now famous for their prescience. But most were blindsided. And even worrywarts who felt something was amiss had no idea of how bad the consequences would be.
>
> That was partly to do with professional silos, which limited both the tools available and the imaginations of the practitioners. Few financial economists thought much about illiquidity or counterparty risk, or instancee, bcause their standard models ignore it; and few worried about the effect on the overall economy of the markets for all asset classes seizing up simultaneously, since few believed that was possible.
>
> Macroeconomists also had a blindspot their standardd models assmed that capital markets work perfectly. Their framework reflected an uneasy truce between the intellectual heirs of Keynes, who accept that economies can fall short of their potential, and purists who hold that supply must always equal demand. The models that epitomise this synthesis—the sort used in many central banks—incorporate imperfections in labour markets ("sticky" wages, for instance, which allow unemployment to rise), but make no room for such blemishes in finance. By assuming that capital markets worked perfectly, macroeconomists were largely able toignore the econnomy's financial plumbing. But models that ignored finance had little chance of spotting a calamity that stemmed from it.
>
> What about trying to fix it? Here the financial crisis has blown apart the fragile consensus between purists and Keynesians that monetary policy was th best way to smooth the business cycle. In many countries short-term interest rates are near zero and in a banking crisis monetary policy works less well. With their compromise tool useless, both sides have retreated to their roots, ignoring the other camp's ideas. Keynesians, such as Mr Krugman, have bcome uncriitical supporers of fiscal stimulus. Purists are vocal opponents. To outsiders, the cacophony underlines the profession's uselessness.
>
> Add these criticisms together and there is a clear case for reinvention, especially in macroeconomics. Just as the Depression spawned Keynesianism, and the 1970s stagflation uelled a baccklash, creative destruction is already under way. Central banks are busy bolting crude analyses of financial markets onto their workhorse models. Financial economists are studying the way that incentives can skew market efficiency. And today's dilemmas are prompting new research: which form of fiscal stimulus is most effective? How do you best loosen monetary policy when interest rates are at zero? And so on.
>
> But a broader change in mindset is still needed. Economists need to reach out from their specialised silos: macroeconomists must understand finance, ad finance profeessors need to think harder about the context within which markets work. And everybody needs to work harder on understanding asset bubbles and what happens when they burst. For in the end economists are social scientists, trying to understand the real world. And the financial crisis has changed that world.
>

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[MediaValue] What went wrong with economics

 

What went wrong with economics

Jul 16th 2009
From The Economist print edition

And how the discipline should change to avoid the mistakes of the past

OF ALL the economic bubbles that have been pricked, few have burst more spectacularly than the reputation of economics itself. A few years ago, the dismal science was being acclaimed as a way of explaining ever more forms of human behaviour, from drug-dealing to sumo-wrestling. Wall Street ransacked the best universities for game theorists and options modellers. And on the public stage, economists were seen as far more trustworthy than politicians. John McCain joked that Alan Greenspan, then chairman of the Federal Reserve, was so indispensable that if he died, the president should "prop him up and put a pair of dark glasses on him."

In the wake of the biggest economic calamity in 80 years that reputation has taken a beating. In the public mind an arrogant profession has been humbled. Though economists are still at the centre of the policy debate—think of Ben Bernanke or Larry Summers in America or Mervyn King in Britain—their pronouncements are viewed with more scepticism than before. The profession itself is suffering from guilt and rancour. In a recent lecture, Paul Krugman, winner of the Nobel prize in economics in 2008, argued that much of the past 30 years of macroeconomics was "spectacularly useless at best, and positively harmful at worst." Barry Eichengreen, a prominent American economic historian, says the crisis has "cast into doubt much of what we thought we knew about economics."

In its crudest form—the idea that economics as a whole is discredited—the current backlash has gone far too far. If ignorance allowed investors and politicians to exaggerate the virtues of economics, it now blinds them to its benefits. Economics is less a slavish creed than a prism through which to understand the world. It is a broad canon, stretching from theories to explain how prices are determined to how economies grow. Much of that body of knowledge has no link to the financial crisis and remains as useful as ever.

And if economics as a broad discipline deserves a robust defence, so does the free-market paradigm. Too many people, especially in Europe, equate mistakes made by economists with a failure of economic liberalism. Their logic seems to be that if economists got things wrong, then politicians will do better. That is a false—and dangerous—conclusion.

Rational fools

These important caveats, however, should not obscure the fact that two central parts of the discipline—macroeconomics and financial economics—are now, rightly, being severely re-examined. There are three main critiques: that macro and financial economists helped cause the crisis, that they failed to spot it, and that they have no idea how to fix it.

The first charge is half right. Macroeconomists, especially within central banks, were too fixated on taming inflation and too cavalier about asset bubbles. Financial economists, meanwhile, formalised theories of the efficiency of markets, fuelling the notion that markets would regulate themselves and financial innovation was always beneficial. Wall Street's most esoteric instruments were built on these ideas.

But economists were hardly naive believers in market efficiency. Financial academics have spent much of the past 30 years poking holes in the "efficient market hypothesis". A recent ranking of academic economists was topped by Joseph Stiglitz and Andrei Shleifer, two prominent hole-pokers. A newly prominent field, behavioural economics, concentrates on the consequences of irrational actions.

So there were caveats aplenty. But as insights from academia arrived in the rough and tumble of Wall Street, such delicacies were put aside. And absurd assumptions were added. No economic theory suggests you should value mortgage derivatives on the basis that house prices would always rise. Finance professors are not to blame for this, but they might have shouted more loudly that their insights were being misused. Instead many cheered the party along (often from within banks). Put that together with the complacency of the macroeconomists and there were too few voices shouting stop.

Blindsided and divided

The charge that most economists failed to see the crisis coming also has merit. To be sure, some warned of trouble. The likes of Robert Shiller of Yale, Nouriel Roubini of New York University and the team at the Bank for International Settlements are now famous for their prescience. But most were blindsided. And even worrywarts who felt something was amiss had no idea of how bad the consequences would be.

That was partly to do with professional silos, which limited both the tools available and the imaginations of the practitioners. Few financial economists thought much about illiquidity or counterparty risk, for instance, because their standard models ignore it; and few worried about the effect on the overall economy of the markets for all asset classes seizing up simultaneously, since few believed that was possible.

Macroeconomists also had a blindspot: their standard models assumed that capital markets work perfectly. Their framework reflected an uneasy truce between the intellectual heirs of Keynes, who accept that economies can fall short of their potential, and purists who hold that supply must always equal demand. The models that epitomise this synthesis—the sort used in many central banks—incorporate imperfections in labour markets ("sticky" wages, for instance, which allow unemployment to rise), but make no room for such blemishes in finance. By assuming that capital markets worked perfectly, macroeconomists were largely able to ignore the economy's financial plumbing. But models that ignored finance had little chance of spotting a calamity that stemmed from it.

What about trying to fix it? Here the financial crisis has blown apart the fragile consensus between purists and Keynesians that monetary policy was the best way to smooth the business cycle. In many countries short-term interest rates are near zero and in a banking crisis monetary policy works less well. With their compromise tool useless, both sides have retreated to their roots, ignoring the other camp's ideas. Keynesians, such as Mr Krugman, have become uncritical supporters of fiscal stimulus. Purists are vocal opponents. To outsiders, the cacophony underlines the profession's uselessness.

Add these criticisms together and there is a clear case for reinvention, especially in macroeconomics. Just as the Depression spawned Keynesianism, and the 1970s stagflation fuelled a backlash, creative destruction is already under way. Central banks are busy bolting crude analyses of financial markets onto their workhorse models. Financial economists are studying the way that incentives can skew market efficiency. And today's dilemmas are prompting new research: which form of fiscal stimulus is most effective? How do you best loosen monetary policy when interest rates are at zero? And so on.

But a broader change in mindset is still needed. Economists need to reach out from their specialised silos: macroeconomists must understand finance, and finance professors need to think harder about the context within which markets work. And everybody needs to work harder on understanding asset bubbles and what happens when they burst. For in the end economists are social scientists, trying to understand the real world. And the financial crisis has changed that world.

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